芸術と社会科学ジャーナル

The Strategy Selection of Government Supervision and Closed-loop Supply Chain's Environmental Investment: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract

Jianhua Wang, Xianfeng Huang and Liu Xu

Considering some closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) gives little money to improve its operation system environmentally, an evolutionary game model of the strategy selection of the government supervision and the CLSC’s environmental investment is set up. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is explored in six different circumstances, and some numerical simulation experiments are made to discover the impact of the decision parameters’ values and the two initial population rates on the ESS. The results show: (1) When there is high income from the investment, CLSCs will invest money to improve its environmental operation ability no matter whether the governments supervise or not. (2) When income from the investment is not very large, the governments need to increase the punishment and reward values, and implement some incentive policies to improve the development of environmental techniques in order to decrease the investment cost for CLSCs.